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Abstract 
This paper surveys the history of the oil industry with a particular focus on the events associated with changes in the 
price of oil from the perspectives of oil production and oil reserves. The discussions include Hotelling’s theory on 
economics of non-renewable resource, peak oil theory, Hubbert’s curve and prediction on future oil production and 
reserves based upon the recent developments in the world supply of oil. 
 




















Oil plays a unique role in the world economy, both historically and today. Since the middle of the twentieth 
century, crude oil has become a chief indicator of economic activity worldwide, because of its great importance in 
the supply of global energy demands. Since oil was commercially discovered in 1859, there has been vast interest in 
studying oil and its relation to the economy, society, and environment. This is because no other raw material has 
been so critical in shaping the destiny of nations, the way our societies interact and are organised. More than any 
other raw material, oil has shaped our lives, and inevitably, such a prominent role has made it the world’s most 
valuable and most controversial resource. One issue that the public has been particularly concerned about is oil price 
fluctuations, so that these have now become, primarily since the Yom Kippur War (October 1973), one of the top 
current issues covered in the vast majority of the world’s newspapers. 
Up to the beginning of the twenty-first century, the prices of crude oil were relatively stable. Oil was sourced 
mostly from Middle East nations, and there was always enough reserve production capacity to ensure that oil prices 
– excluding the period of the two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 when prices soared because of politically induced 
shortages – would remain low. Real oil prices fluctuated between US$10 and US$24 per barrel from 1945 up to 
1971. However, this scenario changed drastically in the twenty-first century. Prices rose from US$20 per barrel in 
1999 to close to US$80 per barrel in August 2006 and then continued to increase, exceeding US$100 per barrel in 
May 2008 (see Figure 1). Crude oil prices surged to a record high of US$132 per barrel in July 2008 before plunging 
to US$41 per barrel five months later in December 2008. Between January 2009 to April 2010, crude oil prices had 
risen by almost 100%, where oil was traded at US$84 per barrel in April 2010. The recent surge in oil prices raised 
fears of whether the world economy was able to absorb such massive price increases and whether economic 
development would be adversely affected. As oil prices reach new heights, some analysts are starting to believe that 
oil prices in the commodity markets are influenced by a different set of factors than those that conventionally 
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Figure 1: Oil Price in Nominal and Real Term 
Source: International Energy Agency 
 
Undoubtedly, one of the most important factors that have caused the surge in the price of oil is the exponentially 
increasing world demand for oil. Since the mid-1980s, when the world economy recovered from the twin (1973 and 
1979) oil shocks, the demand for oil has been increasing at a relatively constant rate of 1.5% per annum. World 
demand, according to the 2007 edition of BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy, reached 83.7 million barrels per 




global economic recession that began in 2008 and continued into 2009, a return to trend growth is expected over the 
long term as national economies recover (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2009). In particular, the developing 
economies of non-OECD Asia and the Middle East are expected to return to strong economic growth, accompanied 
by growing demand for energy to fuel transportation and industrial activity. The difficulty that oil-producing 
countries, especially those outside the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), have in 
increasing their production to keep up with demand also contributes to increasing oil prices (Tsoskounoglou et al., 
2008). 
The fact remains that oil is a finite resource, formed on rare occasions in the geological past. It follows that oil is 
subject to depletion. An essential feature of depletion is that the higher the production, the shorter the life span. The 
world started running out when it produced the first barrel, but “running out” is not really the key issue, as the tail 
end of production can drag on for a long time (Campbell, 2002). In fact, there is plenty of oil left. The world has 
consumed a little more than a trillion barrels of the estimated three trillion barrels believed to be in the ground. The 
problem is that the world is running out of “easy-to-get” oil fields, and many of these have reached peak production. 
New oil production needs to be added, not only to compensate for growing demand, but also to offset depletion rates 
of oil fields.  
In 2006, about half of the yearly oil consumption came from some 120 fields, most of which are over 40 years 
old (Korpela, 2006). According to a study of the largest 811 oil fields conducted in early 2008 by Cambridge Energy 
Research Associates, the average rate of field decline is 4.5% per year. The IEA stated in November 2008 that an 
analysis of 800 oil fields showed the decline in oil production to be 6.7% a year, and that this would grow to 8.6% in 
2030. At the present yearly oil production of 31 billion barrels (Bbbl) there is enough oil to last 40 years if 
production holds constant and no new oil is found (BP, 2008). 
Notwithstanding this, by examining the various publications, it is evident that there is a lack of consensus and a 
wide spectrum of opinions and estimates of the remaining world oil reserves and probability and timing of peak oil. 
Peak oil is the point in time at which the maximum global petroleum production rate is reached, after which the rate 
of production enters into terminal decline. One difficulty in forecasting the date of peak oil is in obtaining an 
accurate amount of oil reserves classified as “proven”. Many worrying signs concerning the depletion of “proven 
reserves” have emerged in recent years. This was best illustrated by the 2004 scandal surrounding the reduction of 
20% of Shell’s reserves. Shell paid almost US$700 million in fines for deliberately misrepresenting the size of their 
reserves. As Sadad I. Al Husseini, former Vice President of Aramco, stated in October 2007: “World reserves are 
confused and in fact inflated. Many of the so-called reserves are in fact resources. They’re not delineated, they’re 
not accessible, and they’re not available for production.” 
Most official organisations would agree with the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO) that the 
era of cheap oil is over – or will occur only under global economic recession conditions, when demand is weak 
(Moriarty & Honnery, 2009). ASPO predicted in their January 2008 newsletter that the peak in all oil (including 
non-conventional sources) would occur in 2010. This is earlier than the July 2007 newsletter prediction of 2011. 
However, even if it is acknowledged that conventional oil might be nearing (or even has reached) peak production, 
official organisations are far more optimistic on non-conventional oil. The IEA (2008) states: “The total long-term 
potentially recoverable oil-resource base, including extra-heavy oil, oil sands and oil shales (another largely 
undeveloped, though costly resource), is estimated at around 6.5 trillion barrels” (or more than 80 years of life span). 
These varying opinions do, however, share a common understanding that major new discoveries are becoming rarer 
and that every new barrel is becoming continually more expensive to produce. As remote and hostile areas of the 
planet are being tapped for resources, large amounts of investment are needed for the oil industry in the near future 
to make oil extraction possible.  
As the world is approaching the point at which the depletion of ageing oil fields cannot be covered by 
decreasing new supplies coming on stream, crude oil production will start lagging behind demand for oil. At present, 
there is a common policy evolving among developed and developing countries that aims at broadening the mix and 
sources of energy supply in order to lessen dependence on oil and other fossil fuel imports. The aim is to shift 
primary energy use towards alternative and renewable energy sources while at the same time developing energy-
saving technologies. The oil market will inevitably be affected by the speed of which alternative energy sources and 




It would seem reasonable to argue at this point that in the long run the limited availability of oil, given its great 
importance, may act as a constraint on the economy’s growth potential. An essential element of a non-renewable 
resource according to Maddox (1971) and Nordhaus (1972), as cited in Dasgupta and Heal (1974), is that its market 
price will rise as the resource depletes. An insight into the economics of non-renewable resources may improve our 
understanding of oil production and its price trajectories.  
The rest of the paper continues with a brief discussion on the theoretical background of the economics of non-
renewable resources. Oil production forecast and reserves based on the peak oil theory and Hubbert’s curve are 
discussed in the following section. Finally, concluding remarks are given at the end of the paper. 
2. The Economics of Non-Renewable Resources 
The usual starting point in studying the economics of non-renewable resources in terms of both their micro- and 
their macroeconomic aspects is the Hotelling (1931) model. In the opening sentences of his seminal article, 
Hotelling writes: 
Contemplation of the world’s disappearing supplies of minerals, forests, and other exhaustible assets has 
led to demands for regulation of their exploitation. The feeling that these products are now too cheap for 
the good of future generations, that they are being selfishly exploited at too rapid a rate, and that in 
consequence of their excessive cheapness they are being produced and consumed wastefully has given rise 
to the conservation movement.              
                                                                              Hotelling, H. (1931), p.137 
The paragraph above highlights the recurring theme of the potential overexploitation of non-renewable 
resources. In his paper, Hotelling intended to develop a theory of natural resources because, in his words, “the static-
equilibrium type of economic theory. . . is plainly inadequate for an industry in which the indefinite maintenance of 
a steady rate of production is a physical impossibility. . .” (p. 139). Accordingly, he established the “Hotelling rule”, 
which states that the price of an exhaustible resource must grow at a rate equal to the rate of interest, both along an 
efficient extraction path and in a competitive resource industry equilibrium. 
 In symbols, this is 
                                                                                Pt = P0e
rt
                                                                              (1) 
 
where Pt is price in period t, P0 is price in the initial period, and r is the risk-free interest rate on investments in 
the economy per year. The basic Hotelling model assumes a known stock of a resource of homogeneous quality and 
that the extraction technology does not change over time. Formal Hotelling analysis of non-renewable resource 
depletion generates some basic implications for how the finite availability of a non-renewable resource affects the 
resource price and extraction paths (Krautkraemer, 1998). The central question in non-renewable resource 
economics is: given the initial stock of the resource and consumer demand, how much should be harvested in each 
period so as to maximise profits? 
Based on the work of Neha Khanna (2003), the next section highlights the economics behind the Hotelling 
model with a simple example. A stock of non-renewable assets can be viewed as an asset that generates returns over 
time. The owner of the resource may either extract the resource now or hold on to it to extract in the future. The 
opportunity cost of current extraction and consumption of a unit of a resource is that there is less to extract and 
consume in the future. Any resource left untouched today may be sold at a higher price in the market in the future. A 
resource owner who seeks to maximise the present value of the profits may extract the resource today and invest the 
proceeds and earn r per cent per year. However, if the owner expects the price of the resource to rise faster than r 
per cent per year, then it would be better to hold on to the resource and forgo the interest earned on the proceeds. 
Instead, the resource owner could earn a higher total income by selling the resource at a higher price per unit. The 
opposite argument would hold if the resource price was expected to rise slower than r per cent per year. 
In a competitive market in which there are a large number of sellers, and each seller can sell any quantity at the 




information at hand. The theoretical analysis in the Hotelling model is that, in a perfect competitive market, the 
resource price, or the price net of the cost of extracting the marginal unit of the resource, will grow at rate r. If the 
resource price rises slower than r, resource owners would hold on to current stocks and the market price would rise. 
If the resource price increases at a rate faster than r per cent per year, the resource owners would sell off their asset, 
increasing the current supply in the market, thereby inducing the current market price to fall. The equilibrium price 
trajectory for a non-renewable resource would therefore rise exponentially, as shown in Error! Reference source 
not found. 2, where P0 is the initial price and T indicates the period of resource exhaustion.  
The economic intuition of a continuously rising resource price is that the quantity extracted would continuously 
fall until it reaches a point at which the resource is exhausted. As price rises, the demand for the resource will 
gradually decline. Eventually the price would be so high that demand would become zero. In the basic Hotelling 
model, this is also the point at which the resource stock would be completely exhausted. This is because when the 
resource price is sufficiently high to eliminate all demand, resource owners are left with small quantities of the 
resource. This remaining stock would be of no value to the owner since nobody would want to buy it. Consequently, 
the resource owners would begin to sell off the stock at lower prices before the demand is reduced by the high 
prices. However, this would also mean that there would be an excess supply of the resource in the market, which 
would cause prices to fall. The production trajectory would be extended in time, and again the price would continue 
to rise at r per cent per year until all the stock is completely depleted. The equilibrium production (or extraction) 
trajectory for a non-renewable resource can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Equilibrium Price and Quantity Trajectories for a Non-Renewable Resource 
The economics behind the Hotelling model remain unchanged when a single seller or monopoly owns the entire 
stock of the resource. For the monopolist, Hotelling’s rule is that marginal revenue, not price, will grow at the rate of 
interest. Then whether price rises more or less rapidly depends on the relationship between price and marginal 
revenue. However, if the monopolist faces a static demand curve whereby the price elasticity of demand decreases 
as the quantity extracted increases, the monopolist’s production trajectory will be longer than that of the competitive 
resource owner. This is true especially when both the monopolist and the competitive resource owner have identical 
production costs, initial stock, and consumer demand. The monopolist exploits the relatively lower price elasticity in 
the earlier periods to restrict output and charge a higher price than the perfectly competitive resource owner. 
Consequently, the monopolist extraction path tends to stretch out over time by slowing down the depletion rate. The 
monopolistic and competitive price and quantity trajectories are compared in Figure 3, where Tc and Tm indicate 
resource exhaustion under competition and monopoly, respectively. 
A case in which both the monopolist and competitive firm’s equilibrium price and extraction paths are identical 
is when resource owners have constant elasticity demand curves that are static over time, and when the extraction 
costs are independent of the quantity extracted in each period. The fundamental feature of a constant elasticity 
demand curve, as opposed to a linear demand curve, is that total revenue is the same at all points on the curve. 




proportionately, so that total revenue is constant. In this case, the monopolist cannot increase the present profits by 
restricting quantity and raising price in the earlier periods. 
  
 
Figure 3: Monopoly vs. Competitive Equilibrium Price and Quantity Trajectories 
2.1 Case Study: World Oil 
How well has the Hotelling model predicted the price trajectories of non-renewable resources in the real world? 
The prediction that resource prices would rise monotonically while quantity decreases is typically obtained under 
the assumptions that demand is constant over time and that the marginal cost of extraction rises. For the crude oil 
market, the Hotelling model is best suited to explain the long-run price trajectory of crude oil prices, while short-run 
shocks are the results of temporary production restraints such as OPEC interventions. Initially, the observed price 
trajectory (Figure 2) may be difficult to explain using any single economic model of non-renewable resources. The 
period 1974–1985 saw unprecedented high oil prices. This is explained mainly by institutional and political factors 
that led OPEC countries to restrict production, and the Iran–Iraq war of the early 1980s during which time their 
combined production fell by about 70%. This leads to simple demand and supply analysis whereby equilibrium 
prices rise owing to shortage of supply. 
If the decade from 1975 to 1985 is ignored, however, the trend in oil prices during the 1980s and 1990s seem to 
have been slightly downward, followed by rising oil prices in the 2000s. This is consistent with the results of the 
Hotelling model. During 1980s and 1990s, marginal extraction costs declined, while the growth in world demand for 
crude oil was slower than expected, owing to the combined effect of several demand-side management strategies 
that were put in place following the two oil shocks of the previous two decades (Neha Khanna, 2003). The declining 
extraction cost scenario combines these two factors. The result is a declining price trajectory for several years (as 
observed in the 1990s) followed by an upswing (as observed from 2003 to 2008) caused by rising world demand for 
oil due to higher economic growth. 
The 2008 collapse in oil prices renders the estimation of future oil price trajectories obtained under the Hotelling 
model less predictable. The final outcome would be determined by the interaction of several forces, including many 
non-economic factors that are difficult to incorporate in resource depletion models. Such factors may include 
making an accurate prediction of remaining oil reserves in the ground. However, the size of an oil reserve is difficult 
to assess with accuracy (Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2009). Most sources, including BP’s Statistical 
Review of World Energy, publish official oil reserve figures, which, in most cases, no third party is able to verify. 
Given the complexities involved in making this estimation, the market would respond to information that it 





3. Oil Production Forecasts and Reserves  
In 1998, Colin J. Campbell, a retired BP geologist, published an influential article in Scientific American 
entitled “The End of Cheap Oil”. The article summed up and updated Campbell’s views and suggested that world oil 
production would reach its peak in the first decade of the new millennium. When oil prices began climbing in 2000, 
books and cover stories in prestigious journals echoed and elaborated on his message with an intensity that only 
increased in 2004–2005, when oil prices skyrocketed and repeatedly surpassed US$60 per barrel. The peak oil 
theory has found greater audience following the surge in oil prices since the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Accordingly, this section explains the origins of peak oil theory and other related issues to improve our 
understanding of how peak oil theory may have influenced the recent oil price shocks. 
3.1 Peak Oil Theory and Hubbert’s Curve 
The concept of peak oil is derived from Hubbert’s curve and has been shown to be one of the most reliable 
methods available to oil geologists in forecasting future oil production and in determining the likely peak in 
production of any oil-producing country. M. King Hubbert, a geophysicist and Chief Consultant for the Exploration 
and Production Research Division at Shell Oil, created a model in 1956 predicting that oil production in the lower 
48 states of the US would peak between 1965 and 1970. Hubbert’s prediction was widely discredited. However, 
when US oil production peaked in 1970, his model became widely accepted. Since 1971, US oil production has been 
steadily declining despite the discovery of huge oil reserves in Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico and the use of the best 
oil technology available in the world (Tsoskounoglou et al., 2008).  
Hubbert required petroleum production estimates in order to estimate accurately the size of total oil 
endowments. Hubbert plotted two separate bell-shaped curves based on his estimates for the size of petroleum 
resources in the lower 48 US states; the highest estimate was 200 billion barrels, while his preferred estimate was 
150 billion barrels (Hubbert, 1956). The famous Hubbert’s curve for US oil production is based on his highest 
estimate; see Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Hubbert’s Bell Shaped Model (Hubbert, 1956) 
 
Source: Hubbert, M. K. (1956)  
 
Peak oil is based on the observed production rates of individual oil wells and the combined production rate of a 
field of related oil wells. The aggregate production rate from an oil field over time usually grows exponentially until 
the rate peaks and then declines, sometimes rapidly, until the field is depleted. According to Hubbert’s peak oil 
theory, the production rate of a limited resource will follow a roughly symmetrical bell-shaped curve based on the 
limits of exploitability and market pressures. The maximum of production is reached when about 50% of the 
ultimate production volume has been extracted – the so called mid-point depletion. The area below the curve shows 




point depletion – according to Hubbert – production tends to decline at the same rate at which it grew. By using 
Hubbert’s curve, one can deduce that a global oil production peak will be reached when about 50% of the world’s 
recoverable reserves have been consumed.  
Although Hubbert precisely predicted the peak oil production of 48 US states in 1970, he failed to replicate his 
only success when he tried to apply his method to other countries and the world as a whole. In the early 1970s, he 
projected that the world would reach peak oil production in the mid-1980s at the latest, followed by a sudden decline 
to only 34 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2000. In fact, the actual figure for 2000 was around 75 mbd. Overall, 
Hubbert underestimated the dynamic nature of many variables affecting the evolution of oil resources. These include 
changes of habits affecting consumption, price trends and technological evolution affecting both production and 
consumption, and so on. Nevertheless, the inherent problems in Hubbert’s model have not been corrected, and his 
followers have continually pointed to an imminent oil crisis that has never materialised. One of Hubbert’s famous 
disciples is Colin J. Campbell.  
Like Hubbert, Campbell’s prediction of world peak oil was not accurate either. Campbell made subsequent 
revisions of his own estimates of URR in 1989, 1990, 1995, 1996, and 2002, each time increasing them. Whenever 
his prediction proved wrong, he simply moved forward his projection of peak oil production. Currently, his 
estimates of URR are around 2 trillion barrels. In 1989, his figure was 1.57 trillion. The inability of geologists such 
as Hubbert and Campbell to predict accurately peak oil production lies in the basic rule governing this peculiar 
market: its unreliability. As Leonardo Maugeri in his 2006 book The Age of Oil said: 
 
...none of us must mislead the public by claiming to hold an objective truth in our hands. One may fear the 
exhaustion of oil, but cannot claim to possess a scientific instrument to predict it, as the advocates of oil 
exhaustion do.          
                                                                                                       Maugeri, L. (2006) p. 206 
  
3.2 Forecasting the Peak in World Oil Production 
The Hubbert curve is one of several methodologies used by geologists to predict the exhaustion of oil reserves 
and the timing of peak oil (see Campbell and Laherre, 1998, and Duncan and Youngquist, 1999, for evidence). 
However, the difficulties in making accurate prediction of oil reserves remain: “Neither in 1875 nor today can 
anyone estimate ultimate mineral resources, nor the amount of oil nor the time of remaining production” (Adelman, 
2008, p. 2). 
To date, the US Geological Survey (USGS) World Petroleum Assessment (Ahlbrandt, 2000) of estimated world 
petroleum resources is regarded as the best such evaluation available (Cavallo, 2002). The study was made over 
several years by statisticians, geologists, geochemists, and other experts. It was the first to use a detailed knowledge 
of geology to estimate undiscovered petroleum deposits, and the first to evaluate the phenomenon of reservoir 
growth to better estimate ultimate oil production. Due to the depth of this study, the USGS estimates should be the 
reference values used to understand the future of the petroleum industry. 
In the USGS Assessment, petroleum deposits are placed in one of three reserve categories. Remaining reserves, 
or proven reserves, are those that can be recovered with certainty, assuming existing technology and current 
economic and operating conditions. Undiscovered reserves are those that are highly likely to exist and to be 
recoverable with current technology, based on the best evaluation of geology and reservoir flow available. Reservoir 
growth is allocated according to proven oil reserves. It takes into account observed continued production from old 
oil fields. This term is comparable to the proven and undiscovered reserves. Whereas proven reserves include only 
those estimated quantities of crude oil from known reservoirs, they are just a subset of the entire potential oil 
resource base. Resource base estimates include estimated quantities of both discovered and undiscovered liquids that 
have the potential to be classified as reserves in the future. The resource base may include oil that currently is not 
technically recoverable but could become recoverable in the future as technologies advance. 
As of 1 January 2013, proven world oil reserves, as reported by the US Energy Information Administration (US 
EIA), were estimated at 1,528 billion barrels, about 53 billion barrels (or 3%) higher than the estimate for 2011. 




Iran combined (Figure 5). Around 80% of the world’s proven reserves in 2013 are concentrated in eight countries, of 
which only Canada (oil sands included) and Russia are not OPEC members (Table 1).  
 
 
Figure 5: Share of proven oil & gas reserves for select regions (2013) 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics, South China Sea         Regional Analysis Brief.  
*Note: South China Sea includes proven and probable reserves. 
 
          Table 1: World Oil Reserves by Country 2013 (Billions of Barrels) 
Country OPEC Members Oil Reserves Percentage (%) 
Venezuela  Yes 298 18.1 
Saudi Arabia Yes 268 16.3 
Canada No 173 10.5 
Iran Yes 155 9.4 
Iraq Yes 141 8.6 
Kuwait Yes 104 6.3 
United Arab Emirates Yes 98 5.9 
Russia No 80 4.9 
Libya Yes 48 2.9 
Nigeria Yes 37 2.2 
Kazakhstan No 30 1.8 
China No 26 1.6 
Qatar Yes 25 1.5 
United States No 23 1.4 
Brazil No 13 0.8 
Algeria Yes 12 0.7 
Mexico No 10 0.6 
Rest of World -  6.5 
World Total  1,648 100 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics 
The USGS World Petroleum Assessment allocates the world oil reserves to OPEC and non-OPEC producers. 
The estimated mean of world oil reserves and annual production (billions of barrels; Bbbl) based on this allocation is 





   
 
Table 2: Mean Estimated World Petroleum Resources,   Billions of Barrels, (Bbbl), 2000 
Reserve Category OPEC Non-OPEC World 
Undiscovered conventional 281 451 732 
Reservoir Growth 408 280 688 
Proven reserves 572 318 891 
Total 1261 1049 2311 
Annual Production (Bbbl/year) 11 16 27 
Estimated Remaining Lifespan(years) 72 37 - 
Source: Ahlbrandt (2000) 
Assuming an annual growth rate of 2% for world oil demand, world oil production is expected to rise from 
current levels of about 27 Bbbl per year (Table 2) to a maximum of about 55 Bbbl per year in 2037 (Hakes, 2000). 
After this peak, production should decline rapidly to only 20 Bbbl per year by 2050, a decrease by a factor of 2.75 in 
only 13 years. Higher or lower rates of growth lead to more- or less-rapid depletion of reserves and earlier or later 
production peaks, but the general behaviour of oil production as a function of time is the same, that is, a sharp peak 
in production followed by a rapid decline (Cavallo, 2002). It should be noted that these forecasts refer only to 
conventional oil. Non-conventional oil, such as the tar sands of Canada, or alternative fuels such as biofuels, are 
subject to a different set of restrictions. In particular, the increased supply from shale oil deposits in the US, 
commonly known as ‘tight oil’ has dramatically altered the global supply balance. The IEA notes that US oil 
production increased during 2014 by 1.2 million barrels per day (which is 1.5% of world supply) (16.2% increase) 
to 8.7 million Bbbl, the largest volume increase since 1900 (see Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6: Oil production, total and shares (thousand barrels per day) (1994-2014) 
 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
Although OPEC has larger proven reserves compared to non-OPEC producers (see Table 2) and larger reservoir 
growth, non-OPEC producers have a larger amount of undiscovered oil. These latter reserves are located in widely 




undiscovered reserves than is estimated by the USGS. Nonetheless, it is probable that these undiscovered reserves 
will prove to be more inaccessible and more difficult to exploit than proven reserves, as mentioned earlier. The 
largest undiscovered reserves are located in the US (83 Bbbl), Russia (77 Bbbl), Greenland (47 Bbbl), and Brazil 
(47 Bbbl) (Cavallo, 2002). It is significant that the total reserves of OPEC and non-OPEC producers, according to 
USGS estimates, are comparable. However, current OPEC production levels of about 11 Bbbl per year are lesser 
than those of non-OPEC producers at 16 Bbbl per year. Assuming both groups increase production at the 2% rate, 
non-OPEC producers will deplete their reserves first.  
 
4. Conclusion 
It must be emphasised that a peak in oil production does not indicate that the world will run out of oil in the near 
future. The reservoir growth term in the USGS estimates, in addition to the large proven and undiscovered reserves 
in OPEC and non-OPEC territories, imply that significant amounts of petroleum will continue to be available for 
many decades following peak production. However, the transition to a sustainable economy may be difficult unless 
it is managed with skill and understanding. As oil production becomes more restricted and expensive, and oil price 
increases, alternative fuels and technologies will quickly become more competitive. The market is big enough to 
accommodate both higher-priced petroleum and more-expensive alternatives. Higher-priced oil should signal neither 
the end of oil nor the end of civilisation. 
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